Facing the
pandemic crisis in Garo Hills
AMIT JOHN KURIEN
THE representation and understanding of rural realities of
Northeast India has beenbiased and poor. Garo Hills, an area of nearly 8200 km2 of rural forest-agricultural landscape
and economy, lying at the eastern corner of Meghalaya mostly received attention
for its militant movements which have now been curbed. Yet the media as well as
academic coverage on the complexities of life and livelihoods of people in this
region are scanty; and now, on the impact of the pandemic, abysmal. Therefore,
in order to understand the effects of Covid-19 on peopleÕs livelihoods, a clear
understanding of the backdrop of this region is required.
The Garo Hills
landscape, once an expanse of shifting cultivation (also referred to in policy
circles as jhum) fields, fallows, and forests, has now been
significantly altered with the promotion of tree cash crops such as cashew,
areca, and rubber. The Jhum Control Scheme of the 1950s and agricultural
policies which followed brought tree cash crops such as cashew into the
landscape to replace shifting cultivation. These policies resulted from a blind
belief in the colonial narrative that shifting cultivation was a ÔprimitiveÕ
and ÔwastefulÕ agriculture practice, causing deforestation and soil erosion.
Since the
1970s-80s, crops such as cashew deemed as a Ôcover cropÕ, areca and to some
extent rubber would generate livelihoods and economic growth and people took to
it for cash income, but it also meant intensification (i.e. shortened fallow
periods) of their subsistence practice – shifting cultivation. The rural
population increased in the post-independence era, but not much outmigration
was observed from the region for a long time. Today, most villages in the
region are directly dependent on a mix of shifting cultivation, tree cash crops
and the market for produce. Wet rice production is restricted to the valleys.
There is little terraced farming. By the farmersÕ own choice, both shifting
cultivation and cash cropping in most places are rain fed and free of
fertilizers, all of which take place in this largely remote region.
This paper follows the arc of key changes
that occurred in the rural sector once the pandemic spread, and physical
movement became restricted. It also attempts to point out the larger issues
that plague the region that explain how the pandemic unfolded and the manner in
which its effects were experienced by the Garos on community life and the rural
sphere.
The article is
composed of five sections: the first deals with the immediate effects of the
lockdown and some longer lasting effects on community life and the rural
sphere. The second examines the role of the state in providing relief to
overcome the crisis. The third section elaborates the many ways in which the
rural economy adapted to newer conditions of semi-complete restrictions of
movement and market access. The fourth delves into the deeper issues enmeshed
in Meghalaya society that determined how the crisis played out and might
continue, and the final section provides some key lessons that could limit the
effects of such catastrophes in the Northeast Indian region.1
The main impact
that the pandemic had on rural families was in making them fall back on
subsistence agriculture for food procurement because market closures created
difficulties in trading crops (especially areca, cashew and ginger) for cash
and food. One of the main troubles villagers faced during the lockdown in March
2020 was that it coincided all across Northeast India with the planting season.
In the Garo Hills, and other parts of Meghalaya too, the planting season is
closely associated with heavy dependence on markets for basic commodities such
as rice,
dal, sugar, salt, and fish, and even vegetables.
Villages in Garo Hills thus faced an
extremely precarious period during the lockdown. As state borders closed,
weekly markets shut down; there was limited movement of non-Garos who
constitute the merchants and intermediaries, thus limiting food supplies. The
public distribution system (PDS) was also significantly impaired. The daily
supply of rice and groceries was therefore affected leading to overall shortage
in consumption of food across all household – especially in those less connected
by road and living up in the hills.
The food
scarcity during the lockdown, as well as into the following months of the
pandemic, compelled people to rely on shifting cultivation fallows and
riversides for Ôfamine foodsÕ for subsistence but also for sale. Families
including adults and children regularly gathered yams (Dioscorea spp., Colocassia
spp.,), edible mushrooms and leaves, vegetables, bananas, banana blossoms,
and fruits. But these foods provided limited respite since fallow periods of
shifting cultivation are short now and also little fallow area remain in most
villages.2 Thus,
villagers faced harsh situations through the humid summer of 2020 and into the
monsoon after June.
Even after the lockdown, many farmers lost
money due to lack of access to towns or retailers to sell their farm produce at
the markets leading to a wastage of precious shifting cultivation crops –
all based on natural farming. Some did sell their crops to livestock farmers,
but at throwaway prices. The collective loss during this period, of produce
from shifting cultivation fields – the largest land use in large parts of
the region, if not all of Garo Hills – simply remains unknown. The trade
in cash crops such as areca, cashew, and ginger, the largest source of income for
rural households, halted for quite some time and resumed only after mid-2020.
This amounted to huge financial
losses for several households.
Non-Garos who
lived in the border areas of Garo Hills facing Bangladesh and Assam faced
harsher food insecurity because of the suddenness of market closure. Nearly all
of them were directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture. Many farmers have
their fields across the border in Bangladesh that they could not access because
of strict closure orders. Moreover, non-Garo villagers relied on income derived
from activities that required direct links with markets and also on remittances
– both of which were stalled since many returned home. Such situations
only increased food insecurity.
The daily wage
labourers who form the large unorganized sector were most affected by the
pandemic. Since households with capital did not make land-based investments
fearing another outbreak of hard times, the local well of wage employment dried
up quickly.
At the state level, the government was
thrown out of gear and the staff at district levels found it difficult to
organize food and rations during the lockdown. Relief measures were minimal
during the period of the first lockdown.
The PDS did
resume after an initial pause, but a significant number without ration cards
were left to make ends meet in other ways. Many of these families were young,
married couples settled separately in the villages according to Garo social
customs and who donÕt have productive lands. Some families did obtain free
additional rations of 5kg rice and 1kg dal per person under the Pradhan Mantri
Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) announced in 2020. However, allegations point
to Meghalaya having distributed a lot less than the allocated grains under the
scheme.3,4 Similarly,
the local area development funds of the MLAs were disbursed early on, but much
debate is ongoing in the local media about its utilization.
Temporarily
ceasing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS)
during the initial lockdown led to serious financial difficulties for families
that depended on it for cash income. However, despite a fresh inflow of funds
into MGNREGS after the lockdown, there were mixed reports regarding its
effective implementation, especially in 2020. The Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman
Nidhi (PM-KISAN) meant to support small and marginal farmers played only a
trivial role in supporting farmer households. Only about 9000 of MeghalayaÕs
nearly three million farmers received the annual financial support – the
lowest among Northeast Indian states.5
A heartening aspect was the significant
citizen participation in ensuring relief measures. Apart from the NGOs and
church groups that took part in such activities, citizen groups of adventure
enthusiasts, heritage conservationists, among others, gathered donations and
often put in their own funds to help those in the countryside. Many of these
groups were eventually integrated with the stateÕs plans for distributing
rations. Even though free food items were distributed in villages by the state
government as well as by individuals, it did not match up to the losses the
families were incurring during the period due to loss of crops, hence lack of
steady market access and inability to sell cash crops such as areca nut,
cashew, and ginger.
Initially the pandemic forced rural
livelihoods into disarray. But through the period after the first wave, several
rearrangements by necessity were observed in the rural economy.
1. A rising dependence on shifting cultivation – The
precariousness for livelihoods observed during the first wave pushed families
living close to the roads that depended entirely on cash crops and daily wage
labour or had completely stopped shifting cultivation, to resume the practice
because of its value for subsistence and food security, even though only for a
short period. Shifting cultivation does not sustain families for an entire year
anymore since fallow periods have declined, partly due to expansion of cash
crops.6,7 Crops that did see a rise in production included
ginger, pumpkin, and tubers since it is aimed for local markets and can also be
used for home consumption with longer shelf life. However, the excess supply of ginger
from the region did result in market rates falling drastically this year.
2. Decentralized anti and neo-traders – With the
closing down of main markets, numerous makeshift anti (Garo word for
ÔbazaarÕ) sprang up based on inter-community networks. Temporary shops
fabricated using locally sourced bamboo served the farmersÕ need to sell crops
from shifting cultivation fields, fallows, and home gardens. They also sold
fish, pickles, and other home-made eatables. Individuals obtained essential
commodities such as clothes, soaps, slippers etc. from vendors in towns to
begin small enterprises and shops near the villages itself. This was the only
option as more Covid positive cases rising into 2021 restricted inter-district
movement and regular market transactions.The state borders were closed
restricting movement of non-Garo traders who dealt with much of the market
trade. By the time restrictions eased, many Garo men became part-time traders
and temporarily replaced the non-Garos. These neo-traders also facilitated the
distress sale of livestock by poorer families to overcome income needs.
3. Local food sourcing – The demand side of this story was
that during the last two years many town dwellers expressed enthusiasm in
receiving better quality meat products such as chicken, pork, and beef directly
from the farmer-producers. This created a slow shift in preferences from these
products originally sourced from faraway Assam, West Bengal, Haryana, and
Punjab. The local livestock are in better health as they are both stall-fed and
free ranging with reduced costs of transport pointing to the clear benefits of
supporting local food production and consumption. Fish, however, was still
being sourced from outside the state during the pandemic. Whether the reentry
of the poultry and meat market trumps the interest among consumers to demand for
local meat products remain to be seen.
Deeper problems of poor infrastructure and
systemic corruption and mismanagement hampered the stateÕs response to the
crisis. Biophysical and climatic factors are two of the most important aspects
that hamper infrastructure development in North-east India and Garo Hills.
Monsoon rains become floods. Houses are washed away, and roads give way. These
annual realities of the region affect infrastructural support and the delivery
of services. Both the pandemic years saw heavy rains. Bridges collapsed leading
to loss of road connectivity to many strategic locations such as ration shops
and other delivery points for food.
The region lacks
a well equipped healthcare system. Most serious Covid cases had to be taken to
Shillong or Guwahati – a five-hour journey from the Garo Hills. During
the first wave in 2020, quarantine centres were set up by local village
institutions under the guidance of the village heads (nokma) and other
senior members and largely because of secure inter-community networks.There was
much resistance to setting up these centres in the following year because of a
lack of disbursement of funds by the state government to compensate the
villagersÕ expenses. As of mid-2021, Covid positive cases were steadily on the
rise even in the remotest parts of the region, many of which are undoubtedly
going unrecorded.
These shortcomings combined with the lack of
self-sufficiency in food and increased policy emphasis on market-oriented tree
cash crops such as areca and cashew has led to ecological and social
vulnerability during such crises. The informal institution of the council of
all village headmen – the Nokma Council – thus emphasized the need
to promote greater interdependence among villages of the region during such
times.
The state
government deployed its own ÔiTeamsÕ to provide farmer-market linkages in some
parts of the state such as the Khasi Hills. The Integrated Technology Enabled
Agriculture Management System (also called 1917 iTeams) put in place in 2017,
is an innovative initiative to provide market access by way of vehicle services
using a toll-free number. However, its service in Garo Hills region was poor
during the pandemic when it was sorely needed. Moreover, there were fewer
reports of its role in the management of the crisis in 2021 thus revealing the
incapacity of the government to utilize or efficiently manage existing
services.
The NPP-led
Meghalaya Democratic Alliance (MDA) government is currently caught in rough
waters regarding allegations of corruption in the Integrated Child Development
Services (ICDS).8,9 Meghalaya
governmentÕs preference for delivery of food under the Supplementary Nutrition
Programme (SNP) of the ICDS is currently largely based on giving major
contracts to large industries.This runs against the Supreme Court directive to
preferably offer such contracts to village communities and women Self Help
Groups (SHGs) to bolster the SNP. There is a clear lack of interest on the part
of the government to improve the SNP in this manner. Such an approach could
help retain the agroecological diversity, further incentivize small holder
production (perhaps even innovation) and facilitate youth employment –
none of which is happening.
The non-payment of income support to daily
wage workers and traders under the Chief MinisterÕs Relief against Wage Loss
scheme (CMRAWL) initiated during the national lockdown in 2020 as well as in
the Building and other Construction Workers (BOCW) resulted in the Comptroller
and Auditor General (CAG) highlighting the mishandling of funds.10 At the time of writing this article,
workers headed by the social activist group Thma U Rangli-Juki (TUR) were
holding a protest demanding the release of funds.11 The governmentÕs image was also se-verely
sullied by the CAG report on the audit of the CentreÕs flagship pro-gramme,
Saubhagya scheme (Pra-dhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana) where a loss of
Rs 149 crore was observed.12
Food insecurity in other states in the
country was severe during the pandemic.13 The agrarian sector in Garo Hills and
maybe even other parts of Meghalaya were badly hit by the Covid-19 storm. It
has underscored the vulnerability and lack of resilience for rural livelihoods
with limited market access and state support. A few lessons can be learnt from
this experience that could help in facing the crises yet to come.
First,
overcoming food insecurity and increasing self-reliance is central. Farmers in
Northeast India, given its remote and difficult terrain, depend on shifting
cultivation and wet rice cultivation for subsistence. One way to raise
production, food diversity, self-sufficiency is to enhance the shifting
cultivation system itself but keeping its essence intact which is in sync with
the seasons, terrain, agroecology and culture. Moreover, if there has to be a
concerted effort to improve the SNP and ICDS and prevent malnutrition that
already exists in many parts of Meghalaya, these natural farming systems and
farmers need to be encouraged and incentivized.14 The local crops do not involve fertilizer
or pesticide use, has enormous food diversity, provides ease of sale in local
markets where it has good demand by virtue of its centrality in local cuisines
that form the food culture of the region.
However, the policy framework for it does
not currently exist, though efforts are being made to improve
the situation.15 The
mindset to ÔimproveÕlivelihoods by replacing shifting cultivation with cash
crop plantations for cash income generation is good only if market prices are
steady. There needs to be an honest effort to modify policies, undertake
research on indigenous farming systems, and to market such produce.
Second, the
economic and ecological vulnerabilities in the farm economy are rising. Today,
30% of West Garo Hills district alone has been converted to monoculture
plantations albeit in smallholder form.16 Such rapid transformations increase pest
loads in the landscape. In many parts of Garo Hills and Khasi Hills, several
farmers have already lost many areca fields due to total shedding of leaves
from what appears to be multiple clusters of identical pest attacks. While the
need for cash crops is important, jettisoning subsistence agriculture could
result in greater possibility of impoverishment and vulnerability.
Several
Northeast Indian states were also hit by the African Swine Fever (ASF) right in
the midst of the pandemic leading to the death and slaughter of several tens of
thousands of livestock. Even as one pandemic is being managed, it is essential
to not invite other kinds to our doorstep. Research from similar landscapes
have shown that excessive reliance on a cash crop economy can lead to
ecological problems as well as social and economic differentiation.17
Third, welfare
schemes play an important role in keeping the village and labour economy afloat
because of poor economic growth and unemployment. Better management of crises
requires an honest approach to dealing with existing schemes and funds. MGNREGS
plays a very significant role in the village economy and especially supports
poorer families. The PDS play a significant role but needs to be enhanced with
better quality food in an area where local dietary trends are fast changing for
the worse.
The Government of Meghalaya plans to boost
its economy using agriculture as its mainstay.18 A few things need to be looked at to make
this happen. The infrastructure required for it in an earthquake and
flood-prone region such as effective transportation facilities, cable networks,
refrigeration, and the capacity to utilize existing services needs to be put in
place. The high rates of unemployment, mismanagement of funds and corruption
needs to be curbed. The farm sector in remote, sub-Himalayan, flood-prone
states in Northeast India needs resilience and sustainability as central to its
agricultural, forest, and economic strategy into the future. State governments
need to think hard about how they want to build economies in landscapes with
distinctly different agroecologies and the kind of infrastructure they ought to
be providing for development.
* Research for the article was initiated with ATREE as part of my doctoral studies.
Footnotes:
1. The paper is largely based on my doctoral fieldwork over a period of one and a half years. Data for the post-pandemic period was based on telephonic interviews with villagers, government officials, NGO staff, social activists, journalists, citizen volunteers involved in relief work, traders, town-dwellers. Literature review and limited news accounts during the pandemic were also used to guide the study and complement the above data.
2. A.J. Kurien, S. Lele, H. Nagendra,ÔFarms or Forests? Understanding and Mapping Shifting Cultivation Using the Case Study of West Garo Hills, IndiaÕ, Land 8(9), 2019, p.133 doi:10.3390/land8090133
3. https://www.foodnavigator-asia.com/Article/2020/07/13/India-s-COVID-19-free-food-rations-Government-s-compassionate-gesture-blighted-by-inefficiencies
4. https://theshillongtimes.com/2021/07/26/bernard-demands-free-rice-under-pmgkay-for-beneficiaries-till-diwali/
5. https://www.eastmojo.com/meghalaya/2021/06/08/only-9000-farmers-benefited-from-pm-kisan-scheme-says-meghalaya-mp; The scheme has been crafted to be nearly invalid for the state since it is conditional on farmers having land ownership, something uncommon in Garo Hills and Meghalaya, in general, where lands are held without a title (temporarily or permanently) within com-munally owned and managed villages.
6. Ibid., fn 2.
7. Behera et al., ÔFrom Jhum to Broom: Agricultural Land-use Change and Food Security Implications on the Meghalaya Plateau, IndiaÕ, Ambio 1, 2016, pp. 63-77.
8. https://www.eastmojo.com/meghalaya/2021/06/18/rice-scam-fallout-meghalaya-govt-refrains-from-addressing-media-after-cabinet-meet/
9. https://www.eastmojo.com/assam/2021/06/14/assam-1-lakh-bags-of-fci-rice-seized-from-private-godown-in-kamrup/
10. https://theshillongtimes.com/2020/11/14/cag-reports-non-filing-of-utilisation-certificates-worth-over-rs-4200-cr/
11. https://www.eastmojo.com/meghalaya/2021/07/26/asked-to-vacate-meghalaya-leader-angela-rangad-stands-firm/
12. https://theshillongtimes.com/2021/07/06/cag-detects-rs-149-cr-scam-in-saubhagya-scheme/
13. https://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/poverty-inequality/the-covid-19-crisis-and-food-security.html
14. Chyne et al.,ÔNutritional Status, Food Insecurity, and Biodiversity Among the Khasi in Meghalaya, North East IndiaÕ, Maternal and Child Nutrition 13(S3), 2017, e12557.
15. NITI Aayog, Report of Working Group III – Shifting Cultivation: Towards a Transformational Approach. NITI Aayog, New Delhi, 2018.
16. Op. cit., fn 2.
17. T.M. Li, LandÕs End : Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier. Duke University Press, Durham, 2014.
18. https://megagriculture.blogspot.com/2020/07/meghalaya-agri-vision-2040-2-days.html